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by William Whitney Stueck


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Like most American scholars, William Stueck believed that Communist Chinese intervention in Korea had a decisive impact on the evolution of American policy. Prior to November 1950, the Truman administration had demonstrated some flexibility in its attitude toward communist China. But after that, the United States started to keep down the Communist China. This is because China¡¦s intervention in the Korea War. Therefore, the Korean War became the road for the United States, Soviet Union and China to confrontation.

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The author points out the contradictions in American policy and believes that the confrontation with China could have been .

The author points out the contradictions in American policy and believes that the confrontation with China could have been avoided. The author points out the contradictions in American policy and believes that the confrontation with China could have been avoided.

William Whitney Stueck. HS3S47 & HS3S97: The Last Super Power and the New World Power: the United States and China in the Historical Context. Section: Week 13: The Korean War (Part II): Korean War Orphans. Next: The Korean War: an international history. Previous: Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern general.

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The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950. William Whitney Stueck. August 1982 · The Journal of Asian Studies. This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). Like previous administrations, the Bush.

In Stueck's view, contributors to the . cause in Korea provided support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of collective security but because they saw an opportunity to influence . Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950 brought with it the threat of world war, but at that time and in other instances prior to the armistice in July 1953, America's NATO allies and Third World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism

US Ambassador to China Clarence Gauss recommended the United States "pull up the plug and let the whole Chinese .

US Ambassador to China Clarence Gauss recommended the United States "pull up the plug and let the whole Chinese Government go down the drain". General Patrick Hurley claimed that the Chinese Communists were not real communists  .

Personal Name: Stueck, William Whitney, 1945-. Publication, Distribution, et. Chapel Hill On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book. The administration of the site is not responsible for the content of the site. The data of catalog based on open source database. All rights are reserved by their owners. Download book The road to confrontation : American policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, William Whitney Stueck, Jr. online for free.

Concentrating on U.S. concerns for credibility abroad, Stueck uses recently declassified documents and many interviews to analyze the origins of the Sino-American confrontation in Korea in late 1950. He demonstrates how personalities (Secretary of State Marshall and General MacArthur) and bureaucracies (the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) influenced policy development and how congressional penny-pinching reduced prospects for a prudent American course in Korea.Originally published in 1981.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea epub download

ISBN13: 978-0807840801

ISBN: 0807840807

Author: William Whitney Stueck

Category: Social Sciences

Subcategory: Politics & Government

Language: English

Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press; 1 edition (November 10, 1981)

Pages: 336 pages

ePUB size: 1593 kb

FB2 size: 1158 kb

Rating: 4.4

Votes: 260

Other Formats: lit docx lrf mbr

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Lahorns Gods
It is quite useful to utilize the research of others which developed and discussed events and actions nearer to their historical time setting. The Stueck research documented in this book took place in such a time—some two to three decades after the Korea War Ceasefire began.
Certainly the volume of exact detail which is available today was far more than that with which Professor Stueck contended—so much so that we call the change in situation an “information explosion” overall. However, one of the advantages of the earlier accounts is that they do not have to contend with the what-ifs and happenstances which can twist and sometimes warp earlier events and conclusions through ex post facto applications.
After some sixty-two years of a not so paused warfare/ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula many might assume that we know almost everything about the US-UN-CHINA-KOREA tangles. If foreign affairs were never changing set pieces in geopolitics (as we call it these days) such might be considered a more or less valid assumption.
But populations, their governments, and their living spaces and boundaries change through the living out of lives, struggle, and accomplishment. Quite frequently as we examine the past we find “history repeating itself.”
This book and a few others provide a contemporaneous compartmentalization which provides clear understandings of the problems with which earlier leaders contended.
The drastic effects of American demobilization from World War II, the feared loss of American nuclear weapon monopoly, militant Soviet aggression, and the fall of Nationalist China all challenged with a virtual “devils’ mix” that American leadership, 1945-1950, had to contend.
Another important concern was the strength and viability of the fledgling United Nations and how it might be expected to meet expected responsibilities.
Professor Stueck does a good job of tracking changing American priorities and policies in a joint China-Korea (and implicitly Japan) area of interest. The Chinese Communist threat was clearly the major threat, yet the greatest apprehensions affecting policies, not stated, was the Soviet Union.
As Nationalist China was lamentably lost—one gets the clear impression of that event being one casualty of the overzealous American demobilization thus inability to devote troops to both EUROPE and ASIA—the Korea Peninsula became the major American concern in the area.
Nevertheless official statements of American authorities and various US congressional leaders and members proved to give a different diplomatic view of those concerns.
War came to the Korea Peninsula and at least 65 years of history was changed/written and is still changing as the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) exports weapons of mass destruction and other war and cyber materials to terrorist groups around the globe and American military and diplomats die as a consequence.
It has been appropriately declared that “there is no substitute for victory.”
Lahorns Gods
It is quite useful to utilize the research of others which developed and discussed events and actions nearer to their historical time setting. The Stueck research documented in this book took place in such a time—some two to three decades after the Korea War Ceasefire began.
Certainly the volume of exact detail which is available today was far more than that with which Professor Stueck contended—so much so that we call the change in situation an “information explosion” overall. However, one of the advantages of the earlier accounts is that they do not have to contend with the what-ifs and happenstances which can twist and sometimes warp earlier events and conclusions through ex post facto applications.
After some sixty-two years of a not so paused warfare/ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula many might assume that we know almost everything about the US-UN-CHINA-KOREA tangles. If foreign affairs were never changing set pieces in geopolitics (as we call it these days) such might be considered a more or less valid assumption.
But populations, their governments, and their living spaces and boundaries change through the living out of lives, struggle, and accomplishment. Quite frequently as we examine the past we find “history repeating itself.”
This book and a few others provide a contemporaneous compartmentalization which provides clear understandings of the problems with which earlier leaders contended.
The drastic effects of American demobilization from World War II, the feared loss of American nuclear weapon monopoly, militant Soviet aggression, and the fall of Nationalist China all challenged with a virtual “devils’ mix” that American leadership, 1945-1950, had to contend.
Another important concern was the strength and viability of the fledgling United Nations and how it might be expected to meet expected responsibilities.
Professor Stueck does a good job of tracking changing American priorities and policies in a joint China-Korea (and implicitly Japan) area of interest. The Chinese Communist threat was clearly the major threat, yet the greatest apprehensions affecting policies, not stated, was the Soviet Union.
As Nationalist China was lamentably lost—one gets the clear impression of that event being one casualty of the overzealous American demobilization thus inability to devote troops to both EUROPE and ASIA—the Korea Peninsula became the major American concern in the area.
Nevertheless official statements of American authorities and various US congressional leaders and members proved to give a different diplomatic view of those concerns.
War came to the Korea Peninsula and at least 65 years of history was changed/written and is still changing as the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) exports weapons of mass destruction and other war and cyber materials to terrorist groups around the globe and American military and diplomats die as a consequence.
It has been appropriately declared that “there is no substitute for victory.”
Felolv
William Stueck was awarded the Stuart L. Bernath Lectureship I n 1986. He studied with Charles Neu at Brown University. He is currently an associate professor of history at the University of Georgia, and his research focused on the American policy toward China and Korea during the Truman period. Stueck is the author of ¡§ The Korean war as International History.¡¨, The Wedemeyer mission: American politics and foreign policy during the cold war, and The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 and numerous scholarly articles.
The book ¡§ The Road to confrontation¡¨ is his most representative work. This book tried to find the answer of the question ¡§How did the United States become engaged in this unwanted conflict with China in Korea?¡¨ by analyzing American policy toward China and Korea from 1947 through November 1950. It was divided into four parts according to the time scale, which shows the transition of American foreign policy toward China and Korean.
After the World War II, American policy would be expressed as ¡§ the Decline of China and the Rise of Korea.¡¨ With the Japanese retreat out of Korea in 1945, the peninsula was divided into two, one was ruled by Soviet Union and the other was occupied by America. That¡¦s why Korea became the area of confrontation between the two superpowers. In 1947, forty thousand American troops were stationed into Korea. At the same time, Truman administration decided to withdraw the US force troop from China. Stueck pointed out 1947 was the year of crucial decisions regarding both China and Korea that would exert a major impact on the future of the United States in East Asia.
The second period was under Marshall¡¦s stewardship. In this time (1947 and 1948), General Marshall took a central role in directing China policy and showed concrete policy in China and Korea. In China, the United Stated avoided to expand commitment to the Nationalist government in order to force the Nationalist and the Communists to establish a coalition government. In Korea, on the other hand, the United States expanded its aid to the South Korean authority. On August 1948, the United States promoted the creation of the Republic of Korea, which is below the 38 parallel. It was dependent on American aid for its survival.
The third period was the eve of the Korean war. The Chiang Kai-shek government lost China in 1949. In the meantime, the Truman administration refused to launch new aid programs to sustain anti-communist group in Taiwan. In this period, American policy toward china was ¡§Letting the Dust Settle.¡¨ What was more, the Truman administration left South Korea out of the American defense perimeter in the pacific. That is to say, the American troops withdrew from the peninsula in 1949 and ignored an impending North Korean attack. In this period, American policy toward China and Korea tended to non-involvement.
Although the United States failed to employ an effective strategy of deterrence in Korea, when communist forces moved south of the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, Washington officials barely hesitated before taking extensive action. Again, American tried to get involve with the Koran issue. This is the transition to the Forth period. American policy in the early months of the Korea War was ¡§Containment, Liberation, and Confrontation.¡¨
Like most American scholars, William Stueck believed that Communist Chinese intervention in Korea had a decisive impact on the evolution of American policy. Prior to November 1950, the Truman administration had demonstrated some flexibility in its attitude toward communist China. But after that, the United States started to keep down the Communist China. This is because China¡¦s intervention in the Korea War. Therefore, the Korean War became the road for the United States, Soviet Union and China to confrontation.
As William Stueck¡¦s research indicated, it was a long road for the US East Asian policy to be concluded. The US engagement to the Korean War was not a rash decision at all. As Author said the road of 1947-1950 was ¡§the road to Confrontation.¡¨
Felolv
William Stueck was awarded the Stuart L. Bernath Lectureship I n 1986. He studied with Charles Neu at Brown University. He is currently an associate professor of history at the University of Georgia, and his research focused on the American policy toward China and Korea during the Truman period. Stueck is the author of ¡§ The Korean war as International History.¡¨, The Wedemeyer mission: American politics and foreign policy during the cold war, and The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 and numerous scholarly articles.
The book ¡§ The Road to confrontation¡¨ is his most representative work. This book tried to find the answer of the question ¡§How did the United States become engaged in this unwanted conflict with China in Korea?¡¨ by analyzing American policy toward China and Korea from 1947 through November 1950. It was divided into four parts according to the time scale, which shows the transition of American foreign policy toward China and Korean.
After the World War II, American policy would be expressed as ¡§ the Decline of China and the Rise of Korea.¡¨ With the Japanese retreat out of Korea in 1945, the peninsula was divided into two, one was ruled by Soviet Union and the other was occupied by America. That¡¦s why Korea became the area of confrontation between the two superpowers. In 1947, forty thousand American troops were stationed into Korea. At the same time, Truman administration decided to withdraw the US force troop from China. Stueck pointed out 1947 was the year of crucial decisions regarding both China and Korea that would exert a major impact on the future of the United States in East Asia.
The second period was under Marshall¡¦s stewardship. In this time (1947 and 1948), General Marshall took a central role in directing China policy and showed concrete policy in China and Korea. In China, the United Stated avoided to expand commitment to the Nationalist government in order to force the Nationalist and the Communists to establish a coalition government. In Korea, on the other hand, the United States expanded its aid to the South Korean authority. On August 1948, the United States promoted the creation of the Republic of Korea, which is below the 38 parallel. It was dependent on American aid for its survival.
The third period was the eve of the Korean war. The Chiang Kai-shek government lost China in 1949. In the meantime, the Truman administration refused to launch new aid programs to sustain anti-communist group in Taiwan. In this period, American policy toward china was ¡§Letting the Dust Settle.¡¨ What was more, the Truman administration left South Korea out of the American defense perimeter in the pacific. That is to say, the American troops withdrew from the peninsula in 1949 and ignored an impending North Korean attack. In this period, American policy toward China and Korea tended to non-involvement.
Although the United States failed to employ an effective strategy of deterrence in Korea, when communist forces moved south of the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, Washington officials barely hesitated before taking extensive action. Again, American tried to get involve with the Koran issue. This is the transition to the Forth period. American policy in the early months of the Korea War was ¡§Containment, Liberation, and Confrontation.¡¨
Like most American scholars, William Stueck believed that Communist Chinese intervention in Korea had a decisive impact on the evolution of American policy. Prior to November 1950, the Truman administration had demonstrated some flexibility in its attitude toward communist China. But after that, the United States started to keep down the Communist China. This is because China¡¦s intervention in the Korea War. Therefore, the Korean War became the road for the United States, Soviet Union and China to confrontation.
As William Stueck¡¦s research indicated, it was a long road for the US East Asian policy to be concluded. The US engagement to the Korean War was not a rash decision at all. As Author said the road of 1947-1950 was ¡§the road to Confrontation.¡¨