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On Tyranny: Corrected and Expanded Edition, Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence epub download

by Victor Gourevitch,Michael S. Roth,Leo Strauss


Leo Strauss (1899–1973) was one of the preeminent political philosophers of the twentieth century

Leo Strauss (1899–1973) was one of the preeminent political philosophers of the twentieth century. He is the author of many books, among them The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Natural Right and History,and Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, all published by the University of Chicago Press. Victor Gourevitch is the William Griffin Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Wesleyan University. Michael S. Roth is the president of Wesleyan University and the author of several books, including Memory, Trauma, and History.

Leo Strauss: Thus tyranny in any form seems to be irreconcilable with the requirement of justice. On the other hand, tyranny would become morally possible if the identification of "just" and "legal" were not absolutely correct, or if "everything according to the law were (only) somehow just.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss's classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero or. .Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss's classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in.Leo Strauss (1899–1973) was one of the preeminent political philosophers of the twentieth century. Victor Gourevitch, Michael S. Roth. Издание: иллюстрированное, исправленное.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet . Similar books and articles. Victor Gourevitch & Michael S. Roth (ed. - 2000 - University of Chicago Press. Leo Strauss - 2013 - University of Chicago Press. Being, Time, and Politics: The Strauss-Kojeve Debate. Robert B. Pippin - 1993 - History and Theory 32 (2):138-161. On Tyranny (Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence).

Author Leo Strauss; Victor Gourevitch; Michael S Roth

Author Leo Strauss; Victor Gourevitch; Michael S Roth. On Tyranny is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny.

pages; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. He sides with Plato against Kojève’s Hegel in holding that philosophy cannot cease to be a quest and become wisdom simply.

Leo Strauss, Victor Gourevitch, Michael S Roth.

Leo Strauss, Victor Gourevitch, Michael S. Roth

Leo Strauss, Victor Gourevitch, Michael S. On Tyranny" is Leo Strauss' classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss’s classic reading of Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero, or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. Included are a translation of the dialogue from its original Greek, a critique of Strauss’s commentary by the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, and the complete correspondence between the two. This revised and expanded edition introduces important corrections throughout and expands Strauss’s restatement of his position in light of Kojève’s commentary to bring it into conformity with the text as it was originally published in France.

On Tyranny: Corrected and Expanded Edition, Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence epub download

ISBN13: 978-0226030135

ISBN: 022603013X

Author: Victor Gourevitch,Michael S. Roth,Leo Strauss

Category: Social Sciences

Subcategory: Politics & Government

Language: English

Publisher: University of Chicago Press; Expanded edition (September 13, 2013)

Pages: 358 pages

ePUB size: 1156 kb

FB2 size: 1595 kb

Rating: 4.2

Votes: 285

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Related to On Tyranny: Corrected and Expanded Edition, Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence ePub books

Gtonydne
Avant-Garde Politician: Leaders for a New Epoch

FASCINATING, BUT DEMANDING

This book consists of five interrelated parts: An English version of the dialogue by Xenophon Hiero or Tyrannicus; an essay by Strauss On Tyranny discussing the dialogue; an extensive response to Strauss by Kojève; a Restatement by Strauss; and the Strauss-Kojéve correspondence. Most of that discourse will be of much interest to readers having at least some familiarity with the writings of Plato and Hegel. But two main foci of the book deserve attention by larger audiences.

The first one is the relation between power and knowledge, in the words of Kojéve "what to think about when speaking of the relations between tyranny or government in general on the one hand, and Wisdom or philosophy on the other" (p. 136, emphasis in original). Understanding "Wisdom and philosophy" in a broad sense this issue accompanies governance since its beginnings. But, as discussed in my recent book, it is becoming critical because of the increasingly complex nature of moe and more fateful challenges facing humanity, such as posed by human enhancement, synthetic biology and advanced artificial intelligence. These surpass by far the knowledge and understanding of the vast majority of contemporary politicians, with calamities likely to follow such ignorance by main decision maker if not rectifies (as discussed in my recent book).

Kojéve, who was both a distinguished philosophic thinker with scientific interests and a senior French civil servant, puts it well: "...when it is simply a matter of maintaining an established state of things, without proceeding to `structural reforms' or to a `revolution,' there is no particular disadvantage to unconsciously relying on generally accepted prejudices. That is to say that in such situations one can, without much harm, forego having philosophers in or near power. But where `structural reforms' or `revolutionary action' are ...necessary, the philosopher is particularly suited to set them in motion or to recommend them." (p. 149, emphasis in original).

Leaving aside many related important observations in the book, such as on the need for "intellectual mediators" between "philosophers" and rulers, let me proceed to the second broad issue discussed in the book, which too is becoming increasingly a real one, namely the "end of history" hypothesis (in ways very different from Fukuyama's 1992 treatment).

Two quotes must suffice: Strauss writes to Kojéve about the predicted "end state" that "in the strict sense of the term, there is no more work at all, since nature will have been definitively conquered" (p. 238). And Kojéve later writes to Strauss "The universal and homogeneous state is `good' only because it is the last (because neither war nor revolution are conceivable in it: - mere `dissatisfaction' is not enough, it also takes weapons!)...In the final state there naturally are no more `human beings' in our sense of an historical human being. The `healthy' automata are 'satisfied' (sports. art, eroticism, etc.), and the `sick' ones get locked up. As for those who are not satisfied with their `purposeless activity' (art, etc.), they are the philosophers (who can attain wisdom if they `contemplate' enough). By doing so they become `gods' (p. 255, emphasis in original).

Many other stimulating ideas on a variety of subjects are dispersed throughout the book, such as on the elite intermarriage policy of Alexander when trying to build a universal empire (p. 170) for the first time in human history. But most of the book is devoted to selective discussions of Plato and other classical philosophers, with references to Hegel, Marx and various modern philosophers. Therefore, this book will be of much interest to a limited but highly qualified audience -- fitting the overall preference of both authors for a small number of intellectual companions able to cope with esoteric knowledge (in the sense of knowledge intended only for a small number of suitably qualified persons), which both authors regarded as potentially "dangerous."
This is fully brought out by two quotes from Strauss, with which Kojéve seems to agree (but they can be fully understood only in the context in which they are presented in the book): "The true doctrine of the legitimacy of Caesarism is a dangerous doctrine. The true distinction between Caesarism and tyranny is too suble for ordinary use. It is better for the people to remain ignorant of that distinction (p. 180). And "...in the absence of absolute rule of the wise on the one hand, and on the other hand of a degree of abundance which is possible only on the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its terrible hazards, the apparently ...alternative to aristocracy...will be permanent revolution, i.e., permanent chaos in which life will be not only poor and short but brutish as well." (p. 194).
However I read the book within my endeavor to develop a political philosophy fitting an epoch of metamorphosis and found plenty which justified the effort. So, potential audiences may be larger than may appear on the face of it.

Professor Yehezkel Dror
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Gtonydne
Avant-Garde Politician: Leaders for a New Epoch

FASCINATING, BUT DEMANDING

This book consists of five interrelated parts: An English version of the dialogue by Xenophon Hiero or Tyrannicus; an essay by Strauss On Tyranny discussing the dialogue; an extensive response to Strauss by Kojève; a Restatement by Strauss; and the Strauss-Kojéve correspondence. Most of that discourse will be of much interest to readers having at least some familiarity with the writings of Plato and Hegel. But two main foci of the book deserve attention by larger audiences.

The first one is the relation between power and knowledge, in the words of Kojéve "what to think about when speaking of the relations between tyranny or government in general on the one hand, and Wisdom or philosophy on the other" (p. 136, emphasis in original). Understanding "Wisdom and philosophy" in a broad sense this issue accompanies governance since its beginnings. But, as discussed in my recent book, it is becoming critical because of the increasingly complex nature of moe and more fateful challenges facing humanity, such as posed by human enhancement, synthetic biology and advanced artificial intelligence. These surpass by far the knowledge and understanding of the vast majority of contemporary politicians, with calamities likely to follow such ignorance by main decision maker if not rectifies (as discussed in my recent book).

Kojéve, who was both a distinguished philosophic thinker with scientific interests and a senior French civil servant, puts it well: "...when it is simply a matter of maintaining an established state of things, without proceeding to `structural reforms' or to a `revolution,' there is no particular disadvantage to unconsciously relying on generally accepted prejudices. That is to say that in such situations one can, without much harm, forego having philosophers in or near power. But where `structural reforms' or `revolutionary action' are ...necessary, the philosopher is particularly suited to set them in motion or to recommend them." (p. 149, emphasis in original).

Leaving aside many related important observations in the book, such as on the need for "intellectual mediators" between "philosophers" and rulers, let me proceed to the second broad issue discussed in the book, which too is becoming increasingly a real one, namely the "end of history" hypothesis (in ways very different from Fukuyama's 1992 treatment).

Two quotes must suffice: Strauss writes to Kojéve about the predicted "end state" that "in the strict sense of the term, there is no more work at all, since nature will have been definitively conquered" (p. 238). And Kojéve later writes to Strauss "The universal and homogeneous state is `good' only because it is the last (because neither war nor revolution are conceivable in it: - mere `dissatisfaction' is not enough, it also takes weapons!)...In the final state there naturally are no more `human beings' in our sense of an historical human being. The `healthy' automata are 'satisfied' (sports. art, eroticism, etc.), and the `sick' ones get locked up. As for those who are not satisfied with their `purposeless activity' (art, etc.), they are the philosophers (who can attain wisdom if they `contemplate' enough). By doing so they become `gods' (p. 255, emphasis in original).

Many other stimulating ideas on a variety of subjects are dispersed throughout the book, such as on the elite intermarriage policy of Alexander when trying to build a universal empire (p. 170) for the first time in human history. But most of the book is devoted to selective discussions of Plato and other classical philosophers, with references to Hegel, Marx and various modern philosophers. Therefore, this book will be of much interest to a limited but highly qualified audience -- fitting the overall preference of both authors for a small number of intellectual companions able to cope with esoteric knowledge (in the sense of knowledge intended only for a small number of suitably qualified persons), which both authors regarded as potentially "dangerous."
This is fully brought out by two quotes from Strauss, with which Kojéve seems to agree (but they can be fully understood only in the context in which they are presented in the book): "The true doctrine of the legitimacy of Caesarism is a dangerous doctrine. The true distinction between Caesarism and tyranny is too suble for ordinary use. It is better for the people to remain ignorant of that distinction (p. 180). And "...in the absence of absolute rule of the wise on the one hand, and on the other hand of a degree of abundance which is possible only on the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its terrible hazards, the apparently ...alternative to aristocracy...will be permanent revolution, i.e., permanent chaos in which life will be not only poor and short but brutish as well." (p. 194).
However I read the book within my endeavor to develop a political philosophy fitting an epoch of metamorphosis and found plenty which justified the effort. So, potential audiences may be larger than may appear on the face of it.

Professor Yehezkel Dror
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mullador
This is a must-read text for students of political philosophy. The new edition contains the same material as the older "expanded" versions, plus a previously-omitted paragraph in Strauss' "Restatement" (page 193) that clarifies Strauss' understanding of Kojeve's position.

To take the main parts of the book in reverse order: The correspondence between Strauss and Kojeve in the last third of the book is a gem. It paints a picture of two men devoted to philosophy. One of them happens to be a professor; the other happens to be civil servant. Their positions matter, since eating matters. But they wear their positions rather like coats: they can take them on and off. What defines them is the shared, passionate desire to understand the whole of things. That eros guides their choices and their judgments, of themselves and others. With their immediacy and their intimacy, the letters do readers a great service in giving a glimpse of what Strauss calls "the peak" (a philosopher in dialogue with a philosopher) that never appears so openly in Platonic or Xenophontic dialogues.

The debate between Strauss and Kojeve in their essays centers on the relation of the philosopher to the city or society as a whole. Kojeve holds that the philosopher and the political man are essentially the same: they both seek recognition, the fullness of which requires a universal, homogenous state. Strauss holds that the political man (ultimately, the tyrant) seeks to be loved; the philosopher seeks the admiration of the wise and ultimately himself. The philosopher lives privately and goes into the "marketplace" only out of his love for wisdom, that is, to find other beautiful souls (prospective students or friends). These differences rest upon a deeper difference, a difference about the "first principles": Kojeve holds that philosophy has become wisdom, in the form of the end of history and Hegel's teaching. Strauss holds that philosophy remains "zetetic," reflecting the "noetic heterogeneity" of the whole.

These insights underlie Strauss' amazing interpretative essay. The core of it seems to me to be this: in the action of the dialogue Xenophon contrasts the philosophic and the political lives. The tyrant is the ultimate representative of political life. He reveals the essence of political things (force and persuasion). More precisely, his difference from the philosopher reveals the essence of political things. The tyrant-political man loves his city. The philosopher-stranger loves wisdom. The tyrant wants to be loved. The philosopher does not expect reciprocity. He may start with a desire for recognition or admiration. But taking that desire seriously leads beyond it, to the desire for true excellence, virtue, that is, wisdom.
Mullador
This is a must-read text for students of political philosophy. The new edition contains the same material as the older "expanded" versions, plus a previously-omitted paragraph in Strauss' "Restatement" (page 193) that clarifies Strauss' understanding of Kojeve's position.

To take the main parts of the book in reverse order: The correspondence between Strauss and Kojeve in the last third of the book is a gem. It paints a picture of two men devoted to philosophy. One of them happens to be a professor; the other happens to be civil servant. Their positions matter, since eating matters. But they wear their positions rather like coats: they can take them on and off. What defines them is the shared, passionate desire to understand the whole of things. That eros guides their choices and their judgments, of themselves and others. With their immediacy and their intimacy, the letters do readers a great service in giving a glimpse of what Strauss calls "the peak" (a philosopher in dialogue with a philosopher) that never appears so openly in Platonic or Xenophontic dialogues.

The debate between Strauss and Kojeve in their essays centers on the relation of the philosopher to the city or society as a whole. Kojeve holds that the philosopher and the political man are essentially the same: they both seek recognition, the fullness of which requires a universal, homogenous state. Strauss holds that the political man (ultimately, the tyrant) seeks to be loved; the philosopher seeks the admiration of the wise and ultimately himself. The philosopher lives privately and goes into the "marketplace" only out of his love for wisdom, that is, to find other beautiful souls (prospective students or friends). These differences rest upon a deeper difference, a difference about the "first principles": Kojeve holds that philosophy has become wisdom, in the form of the end of history and Hegel's teaching. Strauss holds that philosophy remains "zetetic," reflecting the "noetic heterogeneity" of the whole.

These insights underlie Strauss' amazing interpretative essay. The core of it seems to me to be this: in the action of the dialogue Xenophon contrasts the philosophic and the political lives. The tyrant is the ultimate representative of political life. He reveals the essence of political things (force and persuasion). More precisely, his difference from the philosopher reveals the essence of political things. The tyrant-political man loves his city. The philosopher-stranger loves wisdom. The tyrant wants to be loved. The philosopher does not expect reciprocity. He may start with a desire for recognition or admiration. But taking that desire seriously leads beyond it, to the desire for true excellence, virtue, that is, wisdom.