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Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (Routledge Contemporary Asia Series) epub download

by Chi Su


As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan Politics, Chinese Foreign Policy and . Su Chi is currently Secretary-General of National Security Council, Taiwan

As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan Politics, Chinese Foreign Policy and East Asian Security studies alike. Su Chi is currently Secretary-General of National Security Council, Taiwan. Prior to this was a Legislator in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and the Chairman of its National Defense Committee and formerly taught full-time at Chengchi University and Tamkang University. Between 1993-2000 he served in the ROC Government as cabinet- level Chairman of Mainland Affairs Council and Deputy Secretary-General of the President’s Office.

Conclusion: Six Variables Epilogue: The Tail Keeps Wagging Chronology. Routledge Contemporary Asia Series.

It is a rigorous study by a perceptive mind analyzing events in which the author played a major part. Conclusion: Six Variables Epilogue: The Tail Keeps Wagging Chronology. The aim of this series is to publish original, high-quality work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of contemporary Asia.

As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan Politics . Prior to this was a Legislator in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and the Chairman of its National Defense Committee and formerly taught full-time at Chengchi University and Tamkang University

Routledge Contemporary Asia Series.

Routledge Contemporary Asia Series.

Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China.

eBook ISBN 9780203891933. SubjectsArea Studies, Politics & International Relations. Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China. As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan Politics, Chinese Foreign Policy and East Asian Security studies alike. Conciliation in cross-strait relations. Tension after the Cornell visit.

Who hasn't heard of Taiwan's Su Chi? Su has long been a noted figure in. .

As a leading player in rapprochement attempts between the two Chinas, Su deserves to be read and understood.

Su was chair of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council in 1999 when Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, shocked not only Beijing and Washington but also most of his own bureaucracy by declaring the existence across the Taiwan Strait of a "special state-to-state relationship

Su was chair of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council in 1999 when Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, shocked not only Beijing and Washington but also most of his own bureaucracy by declaring the existence across the Taiwan Strait of a "special state-to-state relationship. Connoisseurs of cross-strait discourse viewed the statement as tantamount to a declaration of independence

As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan . Author(s) Bio.

Chi Su. Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China is the first book to deal with the role of Taiwan's leadership politics, including the personal political styles of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

A member of the baby boomer generation that.

Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China is the first book to deal with the role of Taiwan’s leadership politics, including the personal political styles of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, in the development of Taiwan’s mainland policy and the consequences for U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Including analysis of the critical and volatile 1988-2004 period, the Taiwan Straits crisis and cross-strait tension associated with the 2004 Taiwan presidential campaign, Su Chi weaves in his personal participation in Taiwan policy making during critical periods in Taiwan’s diplomatic history to provide insight and information on cross-strait relations that is not available elsewhere

As a study of Taiwan’s mainland and US policy this will be a fascinating read for students and scholars of Taiwan Politics, Chinese Foreign Policy and East Asian Security studies alike.

Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (Routledge Contemporary Asia Series) epub download

ISBN13: 978-0415464543

ISBN: 0415464544

Author: Chi Su

Category: Other

Subcategory: Social Sciences

Language: English

Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (November 3, 2008)

Pages: 368 pages

ePUB size: 1181 kb

FB2 size: 1572 kb

Rating: 4.7

Votes: 664

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Fordredor
The problem with academics who are also politicians is that they tend to say one thing when in office, and something quite different when they're in academia.

This certainly applies to National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Su Chi, who is both an academic and has a long history of involvement in government under former president Lee Teng-hui and in the Ma Ying-jeou administration, and served as a legislator for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for a good part of Chen Shui-bian's presidency. Su the political animal has a weakness for hyperbole, such as when, in October 2007, he claimed that Taiwan was developing nuclear weapons, which was false.

A consequence of this is that Su the academic must be approached with caution. That being said, this does not mean Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China is a bad book. In fact, it's a fairly good book -- at least when Su manages to restrain his political Mr Hyde.

Su's book covers the period from 1988 through 2004, which includes tentative efforts to open diplomatic talks across the Taiwan Strait all the way to the end of Chen's first term as president.

The core argument is that from 1988 until 1995, Taiwan and China acted pragmatically and launched a series of talks -- initially secret -- that culminated in official dialogue between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Su covers this period in detail, all the way down to a fascinating description of the protocol adopted to ensure "equality" between the two sides when they met, from symmetrical table arrangements to who was to speak first at press conferences.

Those talks gave rise to the so-called "1992 Consensus," a term coined by Su that he says served as a viable alternative to thornier (and for Taiwan at times unacceptable) terminology such as "one China, respective interpretations." While Su admits that the term was nothing more than a euphemism, he maintains that its ambiguity allowed the two sides to shelve differences and continue the talks.

Not only does this seven-year period coincide with China's economic takeoff and opening to foreign investment, but it also marked a time when Beijing hoped that it could talk with Lee. In Su's view, if there is mutual trust between the two sides and common ground can be found on the basis of "one China," it is possible to build a stable, win-win relationship.

The SEF-ARATS meetings, which remained largely symbolic and did not achieve much of substance besides agenda-setting for future talks, were derailed by two developments of Lee's making: his visit to Cornell University in June 1995, and the development of the Two-States Theory in 1999 -- namely that Taiwan and China are two countries that exit on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's reaction to Lee's visit to his alma mater, Su argues, was based on the perception that Washington was attempting to drive a wedge between Taipei and Beijing and prompted the latter to launch the "offense by the pen and intimidation by the sword" campaign.

The following year, China fired missiles off the waters of Taiwan during the presidential election.

If the Cornell visit derailed cross-strait dialogue, the Two-States Theory "bombshell" sank it, Su argues.

Allegedly commissioned by Lee, directed by the NSC and using "special secret funds," the drafters of the Two-States Theory documents worked under such secrecy, Su argues, that it was "a true mockery of the development process of a nation that claims to be democratic."

Su, who was Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman at the time, laments that he was kept in the dark, and argues that "Mr Democracy" -- a nickname given to Lee -- had set up "his own mini government" for the exercise, which he says either received intellectual contributions from pro-independence elements in the DPP, or at minimum "laid the policy foundations" for the Chen administration that came into office the following year. Nevertheless, it is DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen, rather than Lee, who emerges as the main antagonist in Su's description of the process.

Thus ends a period in cross-strait relations that Su perceives as offering great opportunities for rapprochement.

It also opens a section of the book where Su becomes far more overtly politicized, sounding like a KMT apparatchik and using ideologically laden language. For example, while the great majority of his sources come from pan-blue (ie, pro-KMT) media, on the few occasions where he quotes from papers that are more favorable to the DPP, he invariably prefaces the passage with "pan-green" or "pro-green," as if their credibility were more questionable as a result.

Su also joins the chorus of voices claiming that Beijing was acting rationally while the Chen administration was acting irrationally, its members following their "hearts" rather than their "heads."

He portrays the DPP as intransigent, increasingly radical (on the independence issue) and opposed to cross-strait economic development, while conveniently ignoring the fact that by 2006, official two-way trade between Taiwan and China had almost tripled from the 1999 figure, as did approved investment in China, however difficult it is to determine the exact numbers.

Su also repeats the line that the DPP hurt Taiwan's economy, while making no mention of China's efforts to throttle it, or the global financial downturn that began in 2001. He is also silent on the KMT's domination of the Legislature and the many budgets -- including the MAC's -- that it froze.

This said, his analysis of the Chen Cabinet's failure to reassess Taiwan's position in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US is helpful and less objectionable. Chen's national security team indeed "failed at its mission during this period" and by doing so managed to irritate Washington at a time when its focus was on Afghanistan and the Middle East.

That Taipei's "irrational" troublemaking stemmed from a fear that Taiwan's interests risked being ignored by the shift in US focus and Washington's growing reliance on Beijing, however, is unexplored by Su, who prefers to believe that Chen et al could only think of themselves. His assessment of DPP diplomats, whom he does not hold in high esteem, fails to take into consideration the fact that the DPP had never been in power, did not have the web of contacts the KMT had enjoyed abroad for half a century, and that for decades the KMT had repressed and depleted the future leaders of the opposition in Taiwan.

In all, Su's is a very informative book, which besides presenting large amounts of hard-to-find data opens a window on the KMT's perception of the political environment. That achievement, however, is undermined by bias language -- the Two States "theory" vs One China "policy" -- and an often self-serving selection of sources, especially in his coverage of the March 19, 2004, election eve shooting incident.

His conclusion, meanwhile, exposes Su the politician, where he makes wild and often misinformed assertions about democracy and identity that entirely depart from the otherwise cooler voice he adopts earlier in his book. It is also no small irony that the secrecy and "mockery of democracy" he deplores in the Two States Theory drafting process has become characteristic of Ma's administration.

In his acknowledgements, Su makes a touching ode to his fortunes as a child growing up in Taiwan, and how the nation's economic development and democracy gave him opportunities that would have been unthinkable in China. Su the government official seems to have forgotten that.

(Originally published in the Taipei Times, Sunday, October 4, 2009, p. 14.)
Fordredor
The problem with academics who are also politicians is that they tend to say one thing when in office, and something quite different when they're in academia.

This certainly applies to National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Su Chi, who is both an academic and has a long history of involvement in government under former president Lee Teng-hui and in the Ma Ying-jeou administration, and served as a legislator for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for a good part of Chen Shui-bian's presidency. Su the political animal has a weakness for hyperbole, such as when, in October 2007, he claimed that Taiwan was developing nuclear weapons, which was false.

A consequence of this is that Su the academic must be approached with caution. That being said, this does not mean Taiwan's Relations with Mainland China is a bad book. In fact, it's a fairly good book -- at least when Su manages to restrain his political Mr Hyde.

Su's book covers the period from 1988 through 2004, which includes tentative efforts to open diplomatic talks across the Taiwan Strait all the way to the end of Chen's first term as president.

The core argument is that from 1988 until 1995, Taiwan and China acted pragmatically and launched a series of talks -- initially secret -- that culminated in official dialogue between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Su covers this period in detail, all the way down to a fascinating description of the protocol adopted to ensure "equality" between the two sides when they met, from symmetrical table arrangements to who was to speak first at press conferences.

Those talks gave rise to the so-called "1992 Consensus," a term coined by Su that he says served as a viable alternative to thornier (and for Taiwan at times unacceptable) terminology such as "one China, respective interpretations." While Su admits that the term was nothing more than a euphemism, he maintains that its ambiguity allowed the two sides to shelve differences and continue the talks.

Not only does this seven-year period coincide with China's economic takeoff and opening to foreign investment, but it also marked a time when Beijing hoped that it could talk with Lee. In Su's view, if there is mutual trust between the two sides and common ground can be found on the basis of "one China," it is possible to build a stable, win-win relationship.

The SEF-ARATS meetings, which remained largely symbolic and did not achieve much of substance besides agenda-setting for future talks, were derailed by two developments of Lee's making: his visit to Cornell University in June 1995, and the development of the Two-States Theory in 1999 -- namely that Taiwan and China are two countries that exit on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's reaction to Lee's visit to his alma mater, Su argues, was based on the perception that Washington was attempting to drive a wedge between Taipei and Beijing and prompted the latter to launch the "offense by the pen and intimidation by the sword" campaign.

The following year, China fired missiles off the waters of Taiwan during the presidential election.

If the Cornell visit derailed cross-strait dialogue, the Two-States Theory "bombshell" sank it, Su argues.

Allegedly commissioned by Lee, directed by the NSC and using "special secret funds," the drafters of the Two-States Theory documents worked under such secrecy, Su argues, that it was "a true mockery of the development process of a nation that claims to be democratic."

Su, who was Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman at the time, laments that he was kept in the dark, and argues that "Mr Democracy" -- a nickname given to Lee -- had set up "his own mini government" for the exercise, which he says either received intellectual contributions from pro-independence elements in the DPP, or at minimum "laid the policy foundations" for the Chen administration that came into office the following year. Nevertheless, it is DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen, rather than Lee, who emerges as the main antagonist in Su's description of the process.

Thus ends a period in cross-strait relations that Su perceives as offering great opportunities for rapprochement.

It also opens a section of the book where Su becomes far more overtly politicized, sounding like a KMT apparatchik and using ideologically laden language. For example, while the great majority of his sources come from pan-blue (ie, pro-KMT) media, on the few occasions where he quotes from papers that are more favorable to the DPP, he invariably prefaces the passage with "pan-green" or "pro-green," as if their credibility were more questionable as a result.

Su also joins the chorus of voices claiming that Beijing was acting rationally while the Chen administration was acting irrationally, its members following their "hearts" rather than their "heads."

He portrays the DPP as intransigent, increasingly radical (on the independence issue) and opposed to cross-strait economic development, while conveniently ignoring the fact that by 2006, official two-way trade between Taiwan and China had almost tripled from the 1999 figure, as did approved investment in China, however difficult it is to determine the exact numbers.

Su also repeats the line that the DPP hurt Taiwan's economy, while making no mention of China's efforts to throttle it, or the global financial downturn that began in 2001. He is also silent on the KMT's domination of the Legislature and the many budgets -- including the MAC's -- that it froze.

This said, his analysis of the Chen Cabinet's failure to reassess Taiwan's position in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US is helpful and less objectionable. Chen's national security team indeed "failed at its mission during this period" and by doing so managed to irritate Washington at a time when its focus was on Afghanistan and the Middle East.

That Taipei's "irrational" troublemaking stemmed from a fear that Taiwan's interests risked being ignored by the shift in US focus and Washington's growing reliance on Beijing, however, is unexplored by Su, who prefers to believe that Chen et al could only think of themselves. His assessment of DPP diplomats, whom he does not hold in high esteem, fails to take into consideration the fact that the DPP had never been in power, did not have the web of contacts the KMT had enjoyed abroad for half a century, and that for decades the KMT had repressed and depleted the future leaders of the opposition in Taiwan.

In all, Su's is a very informative book, which besides presenting large amounts of hard-to-find data opens a window on the KMT's perception of the political environment. That achievement, however, is undermined by bias language -- the Two States "theory" vs One China "policy" -- and an often self-serving selection of sources, especially in his coverage of the March 19, 2004, election eve shooting incident.

His conclusion, meanwhile, exposes Su the politician, where he makes wild and often misinformed assertions about democracy and identity that entirely depart from the otherwise cooler voice he adopts earlier in his book. It is also no small irony that the secrecy and "mockery of democracy" he deplores in the Two States Theory drafting process has become characteristic of Ma's administration.

In his acknowledgements, Su makes a touching ode to his fortunes as a child growing up in Taiwan, and how the nation's economic development and democracy gave him opportunities that would have been unthinkable in China. Su the government official seems to have forgotten that.

(Originally published in the Taipei Times, Sunday, October 4, 2009, p. 14.)
Jia
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (Routledge Contemporary Asia)

Survival

Book review

Su Chi, a prominent scholar and member of Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang, has written an intriguing book on the Taiwan question. From his vantage point as a policy practitioner and sharp observer, Su offers not only a first-hand account of Taiwan's relationship with mainland China, but also a sensible analysis of one of the most complicated relationship of our times. Su is currently secretary-general of Taiwan's National Security Council and served as cabinet-level chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in the 1990s. This book grew out of a Chinese-language book, Brinkmanship: From Two-States Theory to One Country on Each Side, published in Taiwan in 2003. He has added new materials and revised the book substantially for publication in English.

The story begins with a fascinating account of secret diplomatic exchanges between the two sides, many details of which were unknown to the outside world until now. There secret overtures in the wake of the end of the Chiang dynasty achieved remarkable success. They resulted in major breakthroughs, particularly the Koo-Wang talks in 1993. This breakthrough was predicated on the principles of `one China, respective interpretations'. After 1993, however, the story took a dramatic turn when Lee succeeded in obtaining a visa from the US government to visit his alma mater, Cornell University. The previous spirit of rapprochement was replaced by confrontation, and mainland China launched fierce campaigns against Lee, even making military threats in the form of missile exercises in 1995-96.

The United States had the most active reaction to this campaign, moving to reduce tension in the Taiwan Strait by sending aircraft carrier groups to the region. The Taiwanese regime reacted only passively. But at the end of the decade, Lee regained the policy initiative by announcing a "Two-State Theory" in 1999, which further angered mainland leaders. The situation deteriorated even more dramatically when the pro-independence leader Chen Shui-bian ascended to power in 2000. Chen clearly wanted de jure independence for Taiwan, a stance that forced the two big players, Beijing and Washington, into yet another round of frantic diplomatic manoeuvres, a situation neither side wanted. Thus, according to the author, during the period from 1988 to 2004, Taiwan was a tail that could wag two big dogs.

Beijing's resort to the use of force in response to Lee's Cornell visit was clearly a mistake driven by desperation. But Chen also behaved provocatively, especially after a pro-Taiwan Bush administration came to power in 2001. Chen made an extremely bold move beyond the `Two-State Theory' in 2003, announcing a `one country on each side' policy, together with a set of tactical steps including `referendum', `(state) name change', and `writing a new constitution'. When he won a second term after surviving a dubious assassination attempt, Chen thought he had obtained legitimacy and a popular mandate for making the final push towards independence. But political intervention from the United States and military actions from the mainland jointly foiled Chen's scheme and Taiwan's status was thus maintained by the two big dogs.

The author identified three impulses that drove these events: the use of force, unification and independence. Combined they formed a combustible mix, which could have resulted in an explosive confrontation. But Su believes they produced a vicious cycle instead, in which none of the impulses could dominate. Thus, Beijing failed to achieve unification through the use of force, and Taiwanese leaders failed to move in any substantial way toward independence, The United States, on the other hand, appears more successfully as a skilful balance-holder in this three-way game. Washington's macro-as well as micro-management of Taiwan affairs seems to have been surprisingly effective. It is an intriguing analysis, and of interest to anyone concerned with cross-strait relations.
Jia
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (Routledge Contemporary Asia)

Survival

Book review

Su Chi, a prominent scholar and member of Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang, has written an intriguing book on the Taiwan question. From his vantage point as a policy practitioner and sharp observer, Su offers not only a first-hand account of Taiwan's relationship with mainland China, but also a sensible analysis of one of the most complicated relationship of our times. Su is currently secretary-general of Taiwan's National Security Council and served as cabinet-level chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in the 1990s. This book grew out of a Chinese-language book, Brinkmanship: From Two-States Theory to One Country on Each Side, published in Taiwan in 2003. He has added new materials and revised the book substantially for publication in English.

The story begins with a fascinating account of secret diplomatic exchanges between the two sides, many details of which were unknown to the outside world until now. There secret overtures in the wake of the end of the Chiang dynasty achieved remarkable success. They resulted in major breakthroughs, particularly the Koo-Wang talks in 1993. This breakthrough was predicated on the principles of `one China, respective interpretations'. After 1993, however, the story took a dramatic turn when Lee succeeded in obtaining a visa from the US government to visit his alma mater, Cornell University. The previous spirit of rapprochement was replaced by confrontation, and mainland China launched fierce campaigns against Lee, even making military threats in the form of missile exercises in 1995-96.

The United States had the most active reaction to this campaign, moving to reduce tension in the Taiwan Strait by sending aircraft carrier groups to the region. The Taiwanese regime reacted only passively. But at the end of the decade, Lee regained the policy initiative by announcing a "Two-State Theory" in 1999, which further angered mainland leaders. The situation deteriorated even more dramatically when the pro-independence leader Chen Shui-bian ascended to power in 2000. Chen clearly wanted de jure independence for Taiwan, a stance that forced the two big players, Beijing and Washington, into yet another round of frantic diplomatic manoeuvres, a situation neither side wanted. Thus, according to the author, during the period from 1988 to 2004, Taiwan was a tail that could wag two big dogs.

Beijing's resort to the use of force in response to Lee's Cornell visit was clearly a mistake driven by desperation. But Chen also behaved provocatively, especially after a pro-Taiwan Bush administration came to power in 2001. Chen made an extremely bold move beyond the `Two-State Theory' in 2003, announcing a `one country on each side' policy, together with a set of tactical steps including `referendum', `(state) name change', and `writing a new constitution'. When he won a second term after surviving a dubious assassination attempt, Chen thought he had obtained legitimacy and a popular mandate for making the final push towards independence. But political intervention from the United States and military actions from the mainland jointly foiled Chen's scheme and Taiwan's status was thus maintained by the two big dogs.

The author identified three impulses that drove these events: the use of force, unification and independence. Combined they formed a combustible mix, which could have resulted in an explosive confrontation. But Su believes they produced a vicious cycle instead, in which none of the impulses could dominate. Thus, Beijing failed to achieve unification through the use of force, and Taiwanese leaders failed to move in any substantial way toward independence, The United States, on the other hand, appears more successfully as a skilful balance-holder in this three-way game. Washington's macro-as well as micro-management of Taiwan affairs seems to have been surprisingly effective. It is an intriguing analysis, and of interest to anyone concerned with cross-strait relations.