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Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right epub download

by Richard L. Russell


Anything less is not strategic intelligence

Anything less is not strategic intelligence

Yet if "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence" is right, everyone is missing the point. And policymakers DO find CIA's output to be pedestrian. Anyone who thinks the CIA is omniscient should reflect on the catastrophes of 9/11 and Iraq, the two biggest intelligence failures since Pearl Harbor.

Yet if "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence" is right, everyone is missing the point. Written by an ex-CIA analyst, it castigates the Agency as ossified and risk-averse, staffed by case officers who recruit trivial agents and by analysts who are too busy producing current intelligence to develop real expertise. Less catastrophically, but no less tellingly, the Agency failed to anticipate the ongoing Arab Spring, just as it failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Russell argues that none of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms have squarely addressed these root causes of strategic intelligence failure and it recommends measures for redressing these dangerous vulnerabilities in American security.

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Xii, 214 pages ; 24 cm. "This book critically examines the weaknesses of . intelligence led by the Central Intelligence Agency in informing presidential decision-making on issues of war and peace.

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence book. Intelligence expert Richard L. Russell probes the roots causes of these failures which lie in the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence book. This book critically examines the weaknesses of .  . Russell probes the roots causes of these failures which lie in the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices. Russell argues that none of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms have squarely addressed these root causes of strategic intelligence failure and it recommends measures for redressing these dangerous vulnerabilities in American security.

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Strategic intelligence and American statecraft Debunking Cold War myths Stumbling after the Cold War . C) 2017-2018 All rights are reserved by their owners.

Strategic intelligence and American statecraft Debunking Cold War myths Stumbling after the Cold War Blundering in the "War on Terrorism" Spies who do not deliver Analysts who are not experts Facing future strategic intelligence challenges Selected bibliography. Corporate Name: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book.

Richard L. Russell Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right. This book critically examines the weaknesses of American intelligence led by the Central Intelligence Agency in informing presidential decision making on issues of war and peace

This book critically examines the weaknesses of U.S. intelligence led by the Central Intelligence Agency in informing presidential decision-making on issues of war and peace. It evaluates the CIA's strategic intelligence performance during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as a foundation for examining the root causes of intelligence failures surrounding the September 11th attacks and assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in the run up to the Iraq war. Intelligence expert Richard L. Russell probes the roots causes of these failures which lie in the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices. Russell argues that none of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms have squarely addressed these root causes of strategic intelligence failure and it recommends measures for redressing these dangerous vulnerabilities in American security.

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right epub download

ISBN13: 978-0521878159

ISBN: 0521878152

Author: Richard L. Russell

Category: Other

Subcategory: Social Sciences

Language: English

Publisher: Cambridge University Press (April 9, 2007)

Pages: 228 pages

ePUB size: 1792 kb

FB2 size: 1677 kb

Rating: 4.5

Votes: 130

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Related to Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right ePub books

Drelalak
No branch of the U.S. government has a wilder image than the CIA. Conservatives hail it as the sword and shield of American democracy, an institution willing to do the dirty work -- torture, regime change, assassinations -- needed to keep us safe. The Left demonizes the CIA as the friend of dictators and thugs, the spearpoint of a secret foreign policy aiming at global hegemony. Everyone acts like the Agency has magical powers, whether for good or evil.

Yet if "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence" is right, everyone is missing the point. Written by an ex-CIA analyst, it castigates the Agency as ossified and risk-averse, staffed by case officers who recruit trivial agents and by analysts who are too busy producing current intelligence to develop real expertise. The upshot is an organization unable to steal important secrets or fathom long-term trends. Policymakers rightly regard it as irrelevant.

Having toiled in the foreign affairs bureaucracy, I can attest that the book is on to something. Case officers DO overwork the cocktail party circuit, waving around money but developing little important intelligence. Analysts DO produce reams of paper that often add little to information already in the public domain. And policymakers DO find CIA's output to be pedestrian. Anyone who thinks the CIA is omniscient should reflect on the catastrophes of 9/11 and Iraq, the two biggest intelligence failures since Pearl Harbor. Less catastrophically, but no less tellingly, the Agency failed to anticipate the ongoing Arab Spring, just as it failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. (The book is wrong on this last point, as George Shultz's memoirs make clear.)

So, readers interested in understanding our palsied foreign policy machinery should get a copy of "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence." That said, they shouldn't take it as the last word. The author plainly had a grudge against managers in the Directorate of Intelligence, which detracts from the credibility of his argument. (He complains repeatedly that DI managers resent people with PhDs. He has a PhD.) His potted "history" of the CIA in the first chapters is incredibly selective. Finally, the excellent, painstaking analytical work that led to the death of Osama bin Laden shows that the CIA doesn't ALWAYS screw up!

Good book, but not five stars.
Drelalak
No branch of the U.S. government has a wilder image than the CIA. Conservatives hail it as the sword and shield of American democracy, an institution willing to do the dirty work -- torture, regime change, assassinations -- needed to keep us safe. The Left demonizes the CIA as the friend of dictators and thugs, the spearpoint of a secret foreign policy aiming at global hegemony. Everyone acts like the Agency has magical powers, whether for good or evil.

Yet if "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence" is right, everyone is missing the point. Written by an ex-CIA analyst, it castigates the Agency as ossified and risk-averse, staffed by case officers who recruit trivial agents and by analysts who are too busy producing current intelligence to develop real expertise. The upshot is an organization unable to steal important secrets or fathom long-term trends. Policymakers rightly regard it as irrelevant.

Having toiled in the foreign affairs bureaucracy, I can attest that the book is on to something. Case officers DO overwork the cocktail party circuit, waving around money but developing little important intelligence. Analysts DO produce reams of paper that often add little to information already in the public domain. And policymakers DO find CIA's output to be pedestrian. Anyone who thinks the CIA is omniscient should reflect on the catastrophes of 9/11 and Iraq, the two biggest intelligence failures since Pearl Harbor. Less catastrophically, but no less tellingly, the Agency failed to anticipate the ongoing Arab Spring, just as it failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. (The book is wrong on this last point, as George Shultz's memoirs make clear.)

So, readers interested in understanding our palsied foreign policy machinery should get a copy of "Sharpening Strategic Intelligence." That said, they shouldn't take it as the last word. The author plainly had a grudge against managers in the Directorate of Intelligence, which detracts from the credibility of his argument. (He complains repeatedly that DI managers resent people with PhDs. He has a PhD.) His potted "history" of the CIA in the first chapters is incredibly selective. Finally, the excellent, painstaking analytical work that led to the death of Osama bin Laden shows that the CIA doesn't ALWAYS screw up!

Good book, but not five stars.
Doomwarden
It is difficult to imagine a better qualified individual to dissect the institutional being of CIA than Richard L. Russell. He is a 17 year veteran of that agency and is now a distinguished academic. Russell is unique among the many authors writing about CIA in that he was a real `working stiff' (intelligence analyst if you prefer) who actually observed and pondered what was going on around and above him.

Russell has produced an insightful, but devastating criticism of CIA and its inner workings. He goes to the heart of bureaucratic ineptitude that has become the norm for the analytic arm of CIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). In this discussion he describes in a good deal of detail how managerial incompetence has combined with a deep seated anti-intellectual bias to produce DI analysts incapable of conducting substantive analysis. He is unique among intelligence writers in his recognition that to be effective, analysts must have target expertise. This look at the DI and the entire process involved in intelligence analysis and production is by itself a unique and invaluable contribution to understanding what is needed to truly reform the U.S. Intelligence System. This alone would be worth the price of the book, but Russell has also done an excellent review of the problems and foolishness that plague CIA's other arm, its clandestine service. Moreover, Russell provides a good deal of useful information on the theories supporting the concept of strategic intelligence and the related issue of the differences between `secrets' and `mysteries'. This is important to understanding what it is that the DI and its former senior branch, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) are supposed to produce. His discussion of the ill advised decision to create the position of Directorate of Intelligence and subordinate the NIC to it mirrors what most informed observers feel about the DNI.

This book is about CIA not the U.S. Intelligence System as a whole. Yet Russell's criticism of CIA and especially his observations on managers and analysts accurately describe analogous problems with the technical intelligence agencies (i.e. the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)). It does not take a good deal of imagination to interpolate from this book that the entire U.S. Intelligence System is broken almost beyond repair. Russell offers some very good suggestions about how to repair the analytic capability of CIA, but these would only fix a part of the problem.
Doomwarden
It is difficult to imagine a better qualified individual to dissect the institutional being of CIA than Richard L. Russell. He is a 17 year veteran of that agency and is now a distinguished academic. Russell is unique among the many authors writing about CIA in that he was a real `working stiff' (intelligence analyst if you prefer) who actually observed and pondered what was going on around and above him.

Russell has produced an insightful, but devastating criticism of CIA and its inner workings. He goes to the heart of bureaucratic ineptitude that has become the norm for the analytic arm of CIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). In this discussion he describes in a good deal of detail how managerial incompetence has combined with a deep seated anti-intellectual bias to produce DI analysts incapable of conducting substantive analysis. He is unique among intelligence writers in his recognition that to be effective, analysts must have target expertise. This look at the DI and the entire process involved in intelligence analysis and production is by itself a unique and invaluable contribution to understanding what is needed to truly reform the U.S. Intelligence System. This alone would be worth the price of the book, but Russell has also done an excellent review of the problems and foolishness that plague CIA's other arm, its clandestine service. Moreover, Russell provides a good deal of useful information on the theories supporting the concept of strategic intelligence and the related issue of the differences between `secrets' and `mysteries'. This is important to understanding what it is that the DI and its former senior branch, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) are supposed to produce. His discussion of the ill advised decision to create the position of Directorate of Intelligence and subordinate the NIC to it mirrors what most informed observers feel about the DNI.

This book is about CIA not the U.S. Intelligence System as a whole. Yet Russell's criticism of CIA and especially his observations on managers and analysts accurately describe analogous problems with the technical intelligence agencies (i.e. the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)). It does not take a good deal of imagination to interpolate from this book that the entire U.S. Intelligence System is broken almost beyond repair. Russell offers some very good suggestions about how to repair the analytic capability of CIA, but these would only fix a part of the problem.