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Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (East Asian) epub download

by Philip A. Kuhn


events (the White Lotus Rebellion, the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion) that challenged the Qing's authority.

some books deserve a permanent place in my pantheon, this old book is in this category.

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While at Chicago, Kuhn published in 1970 Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and .

While at Chicago, Kuhn published in 1970 Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 as part of the Harvard East Asian monograph series, which led to his being granted tenure and a full professorship. In his influential analysis of American historians of China, Paul A. Cohen says that Rebellion and Its Enemies is a "landmark study" which begins to modify the line of interpretation which sees China's modernization as brought from outside China and outside Chinese tradition and that Kuhn "instead addresses the nature of change taking place before the coming of the West.

Similar books and articles. From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), 236–41

Similar books and articles. From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), 236–41. Benjamin A. Elman - 1993 - Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (4):561-583. The Conception of Wealth Among the Merchants in Late Imperial China.

Asian: China and Inner Asia. IV The Rise of Rebellion and the Militarization of the Orthodox Elite. A From Local to Imperial Defense: Chiang Chung-yuan (page 105). B Hu Lin-i Builds a "Personal Army" (page 117). C Tseng Kuo-fan and the Hunan Army (page 135). D Liu Yu-hsun and the Defense of Nanchang (page 152). V Parallel Hierarchies of Militarization. A Orthodox and Heterodox Hierarchies (page 165). B Interaction and Integration (page 175). VI Militia, the State, and Revolution.

Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864. Asia China Geography History Modern (16th-21st Centuries) Political Science Politics & Social Sciences Regional World. More by Philip A. Kuhn. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times.

Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864.

Philip A. Kuhn, Harvard University. HI294: The History of Modern China. Section: Major Historiography on the Taiping Rebellion. Section: Major Historiography on the Taiping Rebellion Previous: The Taiping revolutionary movement.

Harvard University Press, 1970.

Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (East Asian) epub download

ISBN13: 978-0674749511

ISBN: 0674749510

Author: Philip A. Kuhn

Category: History

Subcategory: Asia

Language: English

Publisher: Harvard University Press; First Edition edition (January 21, 1971)

Pages: 272 pages

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The following review is based on the 1970 edition. All Chinese names and other Chinese words have been transliterated using Pinyin:

The goal of this work is to examine the process of China's local orthodox and heterodox elite's involvement in the militarization of Chinese society during the tulmutuous nineteenth century. Orthodox elites here meaning the "scholar gentry" (those that held academic degrees and had significant influence in local affairs, but held no official post) and the "official gentry" (those that held official posts but served away from home). Heterodox elites include Triad groups (although mostly concerned with economics), bandit gangs and armed communities (ie. The Society of God-worshipers).

Kuhn traces the emergence of these elites and their role in the "New Armies" that occurred in mid-century, back to the central government's reliance on local militia to put down the White Lotus Rebellion (1796). However, he stresses that between 1796-1864, this rise in the local orthodox elite's power (such as represented in the "tuan" and other regional military organizations, discussed below) vis a vis the central authorities did not occur outside of the pre-exsisting patterns of organization, but instead exploited them to re-establish the traditional order in the regions distupted by the multifarious events (the White Lotus Rebellion, the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion) that challenged the Qing's authority.

Chapter one gives an overview of state militias throughout Chinese history. Chapter two deals with the development of the Qing's militia policy from the White Lotus Rebellion (1796) to just prior to the beginning vestiges of Taiping activity in 1850.

Chapters three and four examines the forms of militarization undertaken by the orthodox local elites (those sanctioned by the central authorities) during the mid-1800's. These forms of local militarization included both, what Kuhn terms as the "simplex tuan" or "small tuan" ("tuan" means local defense association) and the "multiplex tuan". The simplex tuan could simply be a single village lineage or a "small cluster of neighboring settlements"(p.67). The multiplex tuan could include several tens of villages, or extended to "comprise a dozen or more multiplex and a hundred or more simplex units"(p.69). The multiplex tuan had a broader financial base and tended to recruit and maintain men "who served for pay and tended toward a professional mode of military life"(p.69).

The financial base of these organizations differed in relationship to their size, and later to the increasing ferocity of fighting. Early on, simplex tuan mainly derived their funding through their leader's personal wealth or through the village lineage organization. However, when the crises of mid-century occurred, multiplex tuan grew in relation to the increased violence and along with their growth, new forms of funding came into existence. These included taxes on agriculture, trade and the expanded sale of official ranks.

Orthodox elite organizations included not only these "community-based" tuan associations, but also higher level military forms called "yong" (paid fighters) to suppliment the regular forces (Green Standard and Banner regiments), "whose numbers were fixed by statute"(p.105) and were expensive to maintain. These types of forces became increasingly popular because of their success in fighting the Taiping rebels. Kuhn analyses three of the most popular "yong". One in Guizhou, led by Hu Lin-yi, which attempted to control feuding between Han and Miao ethnic groups in the region, later became involved in anti-Taiping campaigns. Another in Hunan province led by Zeng Guofan, who became the central government's choice for leading the campaign against the Taiping rebellion and one in Jiangxi province led by Liu Yuxun(hsun).

Chapter five is a compare/contrast between orthodox and heterodox elites. Chapter six displays the problems the Taipings faced in attempting to extend civil rule to the rural areas they occupied. Also it shows that the "breakdown of the traditional state" was also caused in part by the Qing's loss of organizational control of rural areas in the post-Taiping era.

Throughout the book Kuhn's treatment of the subject matter raises some interesting questions such as:

How did the abolishing of the civil service examination system in 1905, which had traditionally set the orthodox elite apart from mere commoners, change the social status of both the scholar and official gentry and in what ways, if any, did it stay the same in the early years of the republican era?

Also, how did the urban modernization that occurred during the early 1900's and the realitive lack there of in rural areas effect rural gentry status and their connection to the cities and central government?

While acknowledging these questions are beyond the scope of Kuhn's study, they would nonetheless be an appropriate jumping-off point for further research on China's orthodox elite in late Qing period.
Low_Skill_But_Happy_Deagle
The following review is based on the 1970 edition. All Chinese names and other Chinese words have been transliterated using Pinyin:

The goal of this work is to examine the process of China's local orthodox and heterodox elite's involvement in the militarization of Chinese society during the tulmutuous nineteenth century. Orthodox elites here meaning the "scholar gentry" (those that held academic degrees and had significant influence in local affairs, but held no official post) and the "official gentry" (those that held official posts but served away from home). Heterodox elites include Triad groups (although mostly concerned with economics), bandit gangs and armed communities (ie. The Society of God-worshipers).

Kuhn traces the emergence of these elites and their role in the "New Armies" that occurred in mid-century, back to the central government's reliance on local militia to put down the White Lotus Rebellion (1796). However, he stresses that between 1796-1864, this rise in the local orthodox elite's power (such as represented in the "tuan" and other regional military organizations, discussed below) vis a vis the central authorities did not occur outside of the pre-exsisting patterns of organization, but instead exploited them to re-establish the traditional order in the regions distupted by the multifarious events (the White Lotus Rebellion, the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion) that challenged the Qing's authority.

Chapter one gives an overview of state militias throughout Chinese history. Chapter two deals with the development of the Qing's militia policy from the White Lotus Rebellion (1796) to just prior to the beginning vestiges of Taiping activity in 1850.

Chapters three and four examines the forms of militarization undertaken by the orthodox local elites (those sanctioned by the central authorities) during the mid-1800's. These forms of local militarization included both, what Kuhn terms as the "simplex tuan" or "small tuan" ("tuan" means local defense association) and the "multiplex tuan". The simplex tuan could simply be a single village lineage or a "small cluster of neighboring settlements"(p.67). The multiplex tuan could include several tens of villages, or extended to "comprise a dozen or more multiplex and a hundred or more simplex units"(p.69). The multiplex tuan had a broader financial base and tended to recruit and maintain men "who served for pay and tended toward a professional mode of military life"(p.69).

The financial base of these organizations differed in relationship to their size, and later to the increasing ferocity of fighting. Early on, simplex tuan mainly derived their funding through their leader's personal wealth or through the village lineage organization. However, when the crises of mid-century occurred, multiplex tuan grew in relation to the increased violence and along with their growth, new forms of funding came into existence. These included taxes on agriculture, trade and the expanded sale of official ranks.

Orthodox elite organizations included not only these "community-based" tuan associations, but also higher level military forms called "yong" (paid fighters) to suppliment the regular forces (Green Standard and Banner regiments), "whose numbers were fixed by statute"(p.105) and were expensive to maintain. These types of forces became increasingly popular because of their success in fighting the Taiping rebels. Kuhn analyses three of the most popular "yong". One in Guizhou, led by Hu Lin-yi, which attempted to control feuding between Han and Miao ethnic groups in the region, later became involved in anti-Taiping campaigns. Another in Hunan province led by Zeng Guofan, who became the central government's choice for leading the campaign against the Taiping rebellion and one in Jiangxi province led by Liu Yuxun(hsun).

Chapter five is a compare/contrast between orthodox and heterodox elites. Chapter six displays the problems the Taipings faced in attempting to extend civil rule to the rural areas they occupied. Also it shows that the "breakdown of the traditional state" was also caused in part by the Qing's loss of organizational control of rural areas in the post-Taiping era.

Throughout the book Kuhn's treatment of the subject matter raises some interesting questions such as:

How did the abolishing of the civil service examination system in 1905, which had traditionally set the orthodox elite apart from mere commoners, change the social status of both the scholar and official gentry and in what ways, if any, did it stay the same in the early years of the republican era?

Also, how did the urban modernization that occurred during the early 1900's and the realitive lack there of in rural areas effect rural gentry status and their connection to the cities and central government?

While acknowledging these questions are beyond the scope of Kuhn's study, they would nonetheless be an appropriate jumping-off point for further research on China's orthodox elite in late Qing period.
Gholbithris
Having read Kuln's interesting book Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (story happened during Ch'ien-lung's era of the Qing Dynasty), I find this book a disappointment. The interesting issue that Kuln raised was, the militarization, during the later part of the Qing Dynasty, of or by local elites in the country side (consisting mainly of folks who studied the classics and passed various levels of the Imperial Examinations [with or without actual government posts] plus their relations mainly consisting of rich land-owners). During the downfall of previous Dynasties, there were always different organized rebellions competing for the winner-takes-all rule of the next Dynasty. During the Taiping period, the Qing Dynasty was very corrupted and the social situation was ripe for another possible Dynasty change. More so, the Qing Dynasty was considered as foreign invasion by the Hans population, it would therefore, in the light of the Taiping revolution, be "natural" for Han-Chinese to rise up against the Qing invaders. (Actually, in other Dynasties, it was quite common that some generals of the ruling Emperor fighting to suppress a rebellion ending up overthrowing the Emperor himself. Well, it is better to be served as an Emperor than to serve an Emperor, firstly in view of the absolute power and secondly the Emperor might suspect the General to having bred that kind of thought even it was not the case - "better make the preemptive strike!"). One possible explanation is that Taiping had quickly become the clear dominant contender, no hope of success for other possible contenders.

Anyway, as history goes, the local elites supported the Qing Emperor (nice thesis for further study) and their military force was later integrated in the official structure. The later shift of some non-political administrative duties to the local elites actually made the life of the average countryman better, and in a way (most likely to be the argument to support such power shift as would have been proposed by the elites to the Emperor) had the effect of prolonging the life of the Qing Dynasty rather than otherwise, as was incorrectly suggested by Kuln.

And as history goes, after the 1911 Xinhai revolution, the new Chinese Government (as Kuln observed) tried to minimize the political influence of the local elites in favor of more representative political entities/personalites. But it was only until Mao's era, that the local elites were rooted out (the incidental rooting out of many aspects of Chinese culture is, however, another subject to be investigated).
Gholbithris
Having read Kuln's interesting book Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (story happened during Ch'ien-lung's era of the Qing Dynasty), I find this book a disappointment. The interesting issue that Kuln raised was, the militarization, during the later part of the Qing Dynasty, of or by local elites in the country side (consisting mainly of folks who studied the classics and passed various levels of the Imperial Examinations [with or without actual government posts] plus their relations mainly consisting of rich land-owners). During the downfall of previous Dynasties, there were always different organized rebellions competing for the winner-takes-all rule of the next Dynasty. During the Taiping period, the Qing Dynasty was very corrupted and the social situation was ripe for another possible Dynasty change. More so, the Qing Dynasty was considered as foreign invasion by the Hans population, it would therefore, in the light of the Taiping revolution, be "natural" for Han-Chinese to rise up against the Qing invaders. (Actually, in other Dynasties, it was quite common that some generals of the ruling Emperor fighting to suppress a rebellion ending up overthrowing the Emperor himself. Well, it is better to be served as an Emperor than to serve an Emperor, firstly in view of the absolute power and secondly the Emperor might suspect the General to having bred that kind of thought even it was not the case - "better make the preemptive strike!"). One possible explanation is that Taiping had quickly become the clear dominant contender, no hope of success for other possible contenders.

Anyway, as history goes, the local elites supported the Qing Emperor (nice thesis for further study) and their military force was later integrated in the official structure. The later shift of some non-political administrative duties to the local elites actually made the life of the average countryman better, and in a way (most likely to be the argument to support such power shift as would have been proposed by the elites to the Emperor) had the effect of prolonging the life of the Qing Dynasty rather than otherwise, as was incorrectly suggested by Kuln.

And as history goes, after the 1911 Xinhai revolution, the new Chinese Government (as Kuln observed) tried to minimize the political influence of the local elites in favor of more representative political entities/personalites. But it was only until Mao's era, that the local elites were rooted out (the incidental rooting out of many aspects of Chinese culture is, however, another subject to be investigated).