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The Treaty Navy: The Story of the US Naval Service Between the World Wars epub download

by James W. Hammond Jr.


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The Treaty Navy: The Story of the US Naval Service Between the World Wars tells how the . Navy, despite treaty limitations, pacifist opposition, a parsimonious Congress, and public neglect, prepared for the War in the Pacific it had known was coming for more than 20 years.

Instead, Roosevelt referred to James's Naval History series, which .

Instead, Roosevelt referred to James's Naval History series, which holds only a shortened version. Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant approbation, to which the answer must be that a history is not a panegyric.

1937 the story of the constitution book bloom sesquicentennial us history book.

Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the US-Israeli Covert Relationship. 1937 the story of the constitution book bloom sesquicentennial us history book.

the naval actions of the War of 1812, but in the history of the US Navy. If you like stories of sailing war vessels and the descriptions of the battles, this is the book for you.

The reader might also be slightly amused at the jabs at Thomas Jefferson who certainly did not like the idea of spending money on a navy. I highly recommend this very enjoyable read to anyone interested in not only the naval actions of the War of 1812, but in the history of the US Navy. One person found this helpful.

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. What we undoubtedly ought to have done was to have adopted the measure actually proposed in Congress, and declared war on both France and England.

When the World War I ended in November 1918, George V was the King of. .

When the World War I ended in November 1918, George V was the King of England and he continued to rule up to 1936. He was succeeded by Edward VIII who ruled from January 1936 to December 1936. The Treaty of Versailles put in the hands of France the power to postpone war or even to prevent German recovery by insisting that reparation defaults which were inevitable should be punished by infliction of penalties. In the Naval Conference of 1930 held in London, France blocked the way to any Five-Power Treaty whatsoever and even made a Three-Power Agreement conditional.

James' Naval History covers the years 1793 to 1820. There are some issues with this scan - page 1 is missing, and most of the even page numbers have a smeared brown background, but are readable. This volume 4 deals with 1805, 1806 and 1807. Biggest issue is with the lists at the end of the volume. They have not been reproduced. Why take the trouble of scanning a book and not doing it properly? If the lists are fold-outs and too big for the scanner, they can be scanned in parts. Stitching software was after all invented long ago. Sorry for this rant.

In the beginning of World War II the Royal Navy was still the strongest navy in the world, with the largest number of warships built and with naval bases across the globe. Totalling over 15 battleships and battlecruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, 164 destroyers and 66 submarines. In the course of the war the United States Navy grew tremendously as the United States was faced with a two-front war on the seas

What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting . War of Independence: History of the United States Navy (released 1956).

What we do. Every page goes through several hundred of perfecting techniques; in live mode. Naval Heritage Jonathan Parshall: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Continental Navy Jack. America's Navy: Ready Then, Ready Now, Ready Always. Battle of Savo Island 1942: America's Worst Naval Defeat.

The Treaty Navy: The Story of the US Naval Service Between the World Wars tells how the U.S. Navy, despite treaty limitations, pacifist opposition, a parsimonious Congress, and public neglect, prepared for the War in the Pacific it had known was coming for more than 20 years.

The Treaty Navy: The Story of the US Naval Service Between the World Wars epub download

ISBN13: 978-1552128763

ISBN: 1552128768

Author: James W. Hammond Jr.

Category: History

Subcategory: Americas

Language: English

Publisher: Trafford Publishing; First Edition edition (October 4, 2001)

Pages: 294 pages

ePUB size: 1567 kb

FB2 size: 1756 kb

Rating: 4.7

Votes: 758

Other Formats: mbr lrf azw lit

Related to The Treaty Navy: The Story of the US Naval Service Between the World Wars ePub books

Ranterl
“The Treaty Navy: The Story of the U.S. Naval Service Between The World Wars” by James W. Hammond, Jr. is an excellent and important read, but it is not “good” history. Fortunately, Hammond is up-front about this fact both in his subtitle and his opening and closing comments. This is “story” vice “history” although it incorporates outstanding elements of the latter. However, it’s not thoroughly sourced, nor is it meticulous. Also, some of the author’s opinions—while self-acknowledged as such—are debatable.
.
What Hammond gives readers is a good primer on the character of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps between World War I and World War II. This includes a look at the Washington and London Treaties, at naval diplomacy, at the administration of various Secretaries of the Navy, at Presidential policy, and to a lesser extent the impact of various Chiefs of Naval Operations and Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Commandants of the Marine Corps. There is much more, and much better material here than contained within many more scholarly works. Coverage of the role and legislation of Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia is thorough.
.
One very pertinent myth-breaking observation is that the “battleship admiral” versus “carrier admiral” dispute in the U.S. Navy is a exaggerated construct of latter-day writers, although Hammond only tumbles to one facet of why. Hammond latches onto the differences between officers with a distrust of the British and younger officers more focused on Japan, with the two groups viewing the two weapons systems as the appropriate ones for facing down their preferred enemy. There is far more to this story than Hammond appears aware of.
.
Hammond gives us an excellent look at the professional and social structure of the Naval Service, which reveals the life-style, careers and living conditions of Navy and Marine personnel. A definite appreciation of the activities, leadership and viewpoint of the Marine Corps within the Naval Service comes through, as well as its contribution to the strategic thought behind successful warfare in the Pacific. An excellent series of appendices covers the Color Plans, fleet organization, pay, synopses of the Fleet Problems, aircraft designations and markings, shipboard routine, and then-Admiral King’s brilliant memo of 21 January 1941.
.
However, the author’s opinions and personal piques do mildly taint the work. His dismissive view of Fleet Problems as scripted is belied by other works. He is contemptuous of the concern for safety, but it was far from paralyzing, and it was preferable to the fatally excessive measures that cost the Japanese several ships, damage to 50 more and hundreds of lives. He indulges in 20/20 hindsight regarding dirigibles. And sadly, his chapter summing up the war is riddled with sloppy errors absent in the rest of the work which suggest it was rushed.
.
A reader can sympathize with anachronistic sniping at bean-counting McNamara-era “whiz-kids,” but less acceptable is the use of the terms “Japs” and “Nips” without accompanying quotation marks. Quoted in the context of the time is acceptable, but otherwise after the Japanese have been our loyal allies longer than they were our projected or actual enemies, some respect should be shown.
.
I recommend this book for the unique depth it gives readers for a period in U.S. naval history that is too often erroneously stereotyped as stagnant and backward when it was neither.
Ranterl
“The Treaty Navy: The Story of the U.S. Naval Service Between The World Wars” by James W. Hammond, Jr. is an excellent and important read, but it is not “good” history. Fortunately, Hammond is up-front about this fact both in his subtitle and his opening and closing comments. This is “story” vice “history” although it incorporates outstanding elements of the latter. However, it’s not thoroughly sourced, nor is it meticulous. Also, some of the author’s opinions—while self-acknowledged as such—are debatable.
.
What Hammond gives readers is a good primer on the character of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps between World War I and World War II. This includes a look at the Washington and London Treaties, at naval diplomacy, at the administration of various Secretaries of the Navy, at Presidential policy, and to a lesser extent the impact of various Chiefs of Naval Operations and Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Commandants of the Marine Corps. There is much more, and much better material here than contained within many more scholarly works. Coverage of the role and legislation of Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia is thorough.
.
One very pertinent myth-breaking observation is that the “battleship admiral” versus “carrier admiral” dispute in the U.S. Navy is a exaggerated construct of latter-day writers, although Hammond only tumbles to one facet of why. Hammond latches onto the differences between officers with a distrust of the British and younger officers more focused on Japan, with the two groups viewing the two weapons systems as the appropriate ones for facing down their preferred enemy. There is far more to this story than Hammond appears aware of.
.
Hammond gives us an excellent look at the professional and social structure of the Naval Service, which reveals the life-style, careers and living conditions of Navy and Marine personnel. A definite appreciation of the activities, leadership and viewpoint of the Marine Corps within the Naval Service comes through, as well as its contribution to the strategic thought behind successful warfare in the Pacific. An excellent series of appendices covers the Color Plans, fleet organization, pay, synopses of the Fleet Problems, aircraft designations and markings, shipboard routine, and then-Admiral King’s brilliant memo of 21 January 1941.
.
However, the author’s opinions and personal piques do mildly taint the work. His dismissive view of Fleet Problems as scripted is belied by other works. He is contemptuous of the concern for safety, but it was far from paralyzing, and it was preferable to the fatally excessive measures that cost the Japanese several ships, damage to 50 more and hundreds of lives. He indulges in 20/20 hindsight regarding dirigibles. And sadly, his chapter summing up the war is riddled with sloppy errors absent in the rest of the work which suggest it was rushed.
.
A reader can sympathize with anachronistic sniping at bean-counting McNamara-era “whiz-kids,” but less acceptable is the use of the terms “Japs” and “Nips” without accompanying quotation marks. Quoted in the context of the time is acceptable, but otherwise after the Japanese have been our loyal allies longer than they were our projected or actual enemies, some respect should be shown.
.
I recommend this book for the unique depth it gives readers for a period in U.S. naval history that is too often erroneously stereotyped as stagnant and backward when it was neither.
ARE
I just finished this book and I have learned so much about how the US Navy was positioned at the beginning of WWII, This book is a concise history of the development of US Navy into a world class player due to influence of Mahan, T. Roosevelt and Sims. The reader will see how the US Navy was poised after WWI to become the most powerful navy in the world and had to step back due to the Washington Naval Arms Conference. Subsequent treaties, congressional budget cuts and public hostility towards having "expensive" ships followed and the author explains how the navy survived, developed new technology and built a balanced fleet concept which included undersea, naval aviation and amphibious offensive capability and the leaders who knew how to use it to defeat Japan. Mr. Hammond explains the fallacy of the "battleship admirals" versus the "carrier admirals" argument which in essence was a effort by both so called groups to determine who the most likely enemy would be. If it Great Britain you needed battleships, if Japan you needed carriers and the ability to project across the Pacific. He gives the reader insight to the life of the enlisted men as well and how important it is to have trained sailors manning the ships at a time of low pay and salary cuts. The Marine Corps role in the development of amphibious operations based on lessons learned from the British fiasco of Gallipoli is explained and how Marine involvement in Central American conflicts during the 20's & 30's helped shape the Corp into the instrument used to take the islands the navy would need for bases from the Japanese.

There is so much packed into this book it is hard to relay it all. Suffice it to say, that by reading this book you will understand "why" the US Navy was able to fight Japan when the war that many visionaries like Pete Ellis knew would finally come, versus the "how".
ARE
I just finished this book and I have learned so much about how the US Navy was positioned at the beginning of WWII, This book is a concise history of the development of US Navy into a world class player due to influence of Mahan, T. Roosevelt and Sims. The reader will see how the US Navy was poised after WWI to become the most powerful navy in the world and had to step back due to the Washington Naval Arms Conference. Subsequent treaties, congressional budget cuts and public hostility towards having "expensive" ships followed and the author explains how the navy survived, developed new technology and built a balanced fleet concept which included undersea, naval aviation and amphibious offensive capability and the leaders who knew how to use it to defeat Japan. Mr. Hammond explains the fallacy of the "battleship admirals" versus the "carrier admirals" argument which in essence was a effort by both so called groups to determine who the most likely enemy would be. If it Great Britain you needed battleships, if Japan you needed carriers and the ability to project across the Pacific. He gives the reader insight to the life of the enlisted men as well and how important it is to have trained sailors manning the ships at a time of low pay and salary cuts. The Marine Corps role in the development of amphibious operations based on lessons learned from the British fiasco of Gallipoli is explained and how Marine involvement in Central American conflicts during the 20's & 30's helped shape the Corp into the instrument used to take the islands the navy would need for bases from the Japanese.

There is so much packed into this book it is hard to relay it all. Suffice it to say, that by reading this book you will understand "why" the US Navy was able to fight Japan when the war that many visionaries like Pete Ellis knew would finally come, versus the "how".
Keel
A fine account of the consequences of the Washington Treaty of 1921 / 1922 on the U.S. Navy. It discusses the subject for two points of view: how the treaty affected the design of American warships and how American naval commanders attempted to respond to the Treaty's limitations in the design of the U.S. Navy ships. It covers mainly the design of cruisers, which isn't surprising since construction of battleships was forbidden by the Treaty. It also gives some attention to the design of destroyers and aircraft carriers within the limitations of the Treaty.
Keel
A fine account of the consequences of the Washington Treaty of 1921 / 1922 on the U.S. Navy. It discusses the subject for two points of view: how the treaty affected the design of American warships and how American naval commanders attempted to respond to the Treaty's limitations in the design of the U.S. Navy ships. It covers mainly the design of cruisers, which isn't surprising since construction of battleships was forbidden by the Treaty. It also gives some attention to the design of destroyers and aircraft carriers within the limitations of the Treaty.